The History of Macroeconomics Viewed Against the Background of the Marshall-Walras Divide by Michel, DE VROEY
The History of Macroeconomics Viewed Against the
Background of the Marshall-Walras Divide
Michel De Vroey 
*








Analysing the recent history of macroeconomics, my paper claims that the new classical
revolution should be viewed as a substitution of Walrasian macroeconomics to the earlier
prevailing Marshallian macroeconomics. The first part of the paper is concerned with two
conceptual prerequisites, the relationship between macroeconomics and general equilibrium,
the meaning of the “Keynesian” modifier. In a second part, the different facets of the
Marshall-Walras divide are expounded. My general claim is substantiated in the third paper of
the  paper.  Herein,  I  claim  that  the  IS-LM  model  is  a  simplified Marshallian general
equilibrium model while real business cycle models belong to the Walrasian research
programme. Finally, I express my scepticism as to the possibility of a New Neoclassical
Synthesis.
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* Comments on an earlier version of this paper by David Colander and Kevin Hoover were greatly appreciated.1
1. Introduction
The demise of the line of thought embodied in the IS-LM model and its replacement by
stochastic intertemporal equilibrium models is probably the most salient change that occurred
in macroeconomics during the last quarter of the twentieth century.
1 My aim in this paper is to
analyse it against the background of what I call the Marshall-Walras divide. According to the
latter, the contributions of Marshall and Walras to economic theory are less complementary
than usually believed. Instead, the Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches are considered
alternative research programmes.
  The underlying reason is their being based on radical
different trade technology assumptions. This divide, I will claim, has a direct bearing on the
unfolding of macroeconomics: the change that has taken place about two decades ago is the
substitution of Walrasian macroeconomics for Marshallian macroeconomics.
2
Before addressing this claim a twofold clarification task must be undertaken. First, I need to
make clear what I mean by the terms “general equilibrium model” and “macroeconomics”,
“Keynesian approach”. Second, I must spell out how I understand the Marshall-Walras
divide. Only after having dealt with these preliminaries, will I be able  to expound my claim
in an non-equivocal way.
2 Terminology
2.1 General equilibrium models and macroeconomics
Usually a general equilibrium model is associated with Walrasian or neo-Walrasian theory,
that is, Walras’ own theory as expounded in his Elements of Pure Economics (1954) or the
Arrow-Debreu model.
3 The implication is that there exists only one way of doing general
equilibrium analysis, the Walrasian. Instead, I will suggest a broader conception resulting
from positing that general equilibrium analysis exists as soon as two criteria are met. First, the
                                                   
1 Several intersting papers on this subject have been published recently: Blanchard (2000), Blinder ([1988]
1997), Drèze (2001), Danthine (1997), Hairault (1999), Lipsey (2000), Snowdon and Vane (1996) and Woodford
(1999).
2 This claim was voiced by some authors who studied what at the time was called “Monetarism Mark I” and
“Monetarism Mark II”, associated respectively with Friedman’s and Lucas’s Phillips curve models (Friedman
1968, Lucas 1972). For example, Hoover noted that “Friedman, as one important monetarist, differs from the
new classicals on a fundamental point of methodology: he is a Marshallian; they are Walrasians” [(1984) 1990,
528].
3 Henceforth the term Walrasian will be understood in a broad sense as encompassing neo-Walrasian models (the
Arrow-Debreu model and its followers) or even models that are often misleadingly called non-Walrasian such as
the Barro-Grossman model.2
object of analysis must be an economy as whole rather than an isolated sub-section of the
economy. Second, the analysis must deal with a formalised or mathematical model.
4
The point to be underlined, because it goes against the grain, is that the Walrasian approach
has no monopoly over general equilibrium theory. It is true that most general equilibrium
models belong to the Walrasian approach but this actual hegemony cannot be viewed as
matter of principle. Alternative programmes cannot be excluded.
My next step is to see how the categories of general equilibrium model and macroeconomic
model fit together. What exactly is macroeconomics? In their recent accounts of the unfolding
of macroeconomics, written at the occasion of the millennium, Blanchard and Woodford
concur in stating that macroeconomics consists of the study of fluctuations (Blanchard 2000:
2;  Woodford:  1999:  1).  It  is  of  course  true  that  present  macroeconomics  deals  with
fluctuations, yet it should not be inferred that any study of fluctuations is macroeconomics.
Moreover, if this definitional stance is taken, it turns out that the IS-LM model does not
belong to macroeconomics!
The term macroeconomics is usually ascribed to Ragnar Frisch, who coined it in his essay
“Propagation Problems and Impulse Problems in Dynamic Economics” (1933: 172). To him,
its concern was “the whole economic system in its entirety” while microeconomics was
defined as concerned with individual behaviour. Unfortunately, this cogent conception has not
been followed, and the meaning of macroeconomics has become messy. What is now called
macroeconomics deals with a whole economy, yet not every analysis bearing on such an
object is usually considered macroeconomics. Take Walrasian theory. Beyond doubt, it
studies the economy as a whole, yet it is ranked as microeconomics. In contrast, why count
real business cycles models, which claim a Walrasian heritage, as macroeconomics ?
To  solve  this  puzzle,  we  should  return  to  Frisch’s  viewpoint  and  consider  that
macroeconomics belongs to the domain of general equilibrium.
 5 In effect, it meets the two
criteria posited above. However, it should be viewed as a sub-category of general equilibrium
analysis  rather  than  being  equated  with  it.  In  other  words,  different  types  of  general
equilibrium analysis must be separated. My suggestion is to draw a distinction between
complex and simplified general equilibrium models.
Macroeconomics then deals with simplified general equilibrium models. They comprise a
small number of variables. They study a few markets, named after those markets that are
deemed to be the most important real-world markets. They deal at once with aggregates, by
reasoning in terms of representative firms or agents. They embed a few institutions, such as
                                                   
4 The rationale for this second condition is that, in its absence, I should always need to draw a distinction
between earlier general equilibrium theories, resoning in prose, and formalised general equilibrium models.
5 This viewpoint was already expressed by Patinkin (1965). It is also to be found in Woodford (1999: 8), Farmer
(1993 : 1) and Young and Zilberfarb (2000: 1).3
the government and the central bank. They are geared towards addressing policy issues, such
as the level of employment, national output, inflation, government deficit, effects of changes
in money supply, etc. Finally, they claim to be empirically relevant and to give results which
can be tested against reality. In contrast, Walras’ model or the Arrow-Debreu model involve a
great number of agents and commodities. They are geared towards more abstract purposes,
like demonstrating the logical existence of equilibrium, stability, etc. Therefore, what is
usually  “general  equilibrium  analysis”  can  be  recast  as  “complex  general  equilibrium
analysis”.
If macroeconomics belongs to the general equilibrium line of research, it is concerned with
mathematical models. Accepting that reasoning in prose is not a model strictu sensu, the
arising of macroeconomics should be ascribed not to Keynes’ General Theory but to the
subsequent models that tried to translate Keynes’ blurred message into a precise model. Here
the IS-LM model stands out. Thus, if my definitional stance is taken, macroeconomics started
with the IS-LM model.
6
To summarise, general equilibrium analysis can be sub-divided along two lines. First, a
distinction must be drawn between Walrasian general equilibrium, the Walrasian modifier
being understood in its broadest sense, and what could be called “Non-Walrasian” general
equilibrium models had this modifier mot be pre-empted by models that actually belong to the
Walrasian line. The contending alternative line that I will consider is general equilibrium in
the Marshallian approach.
7 The second divide relates to the division between complex and
simplified general equilibrium models. By crossing the two criteria, one gets the following
box-diagram.
                                                   
6 Several passages of Laidler’s book on the Keynesian revolution (1999) hint at my viewpoint, although this is
not its main thrust. Let me quote one of them. « Nevertheless, the impression of continuity in the development of
macroeconomics which one might get from the very selective survey of reactions to the General  Theory
presented in the foregoing chapters would be misleadingly incomplete. A break did occur around 1936, and it did
center on the General Theory. The break in question, however, arose not directly from that book itself, but from
the IS-LM model, which a number of younger commentators found in it and used to expound not just what they
took to be its main message, but that of an earlier classical tradition too. » (1999: 303). Other passages are on p.
318 and 324.
7 As well-known, Marshall is an author who can be pulled into opposed directions. There is Marshall the
evolutionary-institutionalist economist, often associated with Book IV of the Principles and Marshal the value
theorist, associated with its Book V. Although the first of these two Marshalls has become more popular than the
second, my interest here lies with the latter. Thus, when speaking of Marshallian theory I have in mind the
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The very story to be told in part 4 of my paper is that of the gradual filling in of the diagram.
The  first  research  programme  to  be  implemented  corresponded  to  the  upper-left  box,
concomitant to the publication of Walras’ Elements of Pure Economics (first edition in two
instalments in 1874-7). The second step was the invention of macroeconomics with Hicks’ IS-
LM model later recast by Modigliani (1944).
8 This model, I will claim, belongs to the
Marshallian approach. The third step, the establishment of Walrasian macroeconomics has
been a more protracted phenomenon. Patinkin can be considered the first modern author
having constructed a simplified Walrasian general  equilibrium model in his Money, Interest
and Prices (1965; first edition 1956). It was later revived by Barro and Grossman in their
disequilibrium model. Although Patinkin’s book exerted an importance influence, the model
it contained was never viewed as an alternative to IS-LM base camp for macroeconomics. Nor
did Patinkin campaigned to this effect. As far as the disequilibrium à la Barro and Grossman
is concerned, its vogue has been short-lived. The age of Walrasian macroeconomics had to
wait the emergence of real business cycle models, themselves the offspring of Lucas’
Neutrality of Money paper (1972). Finally, I associate the creation of Marshallian complex
general equilibrium theory with imperfectly competitive general equilibrium models. In sum,
while Marshallian macroeconomics predates Walrasian macroeconomics, the contrary is true
for what concerns complex general equilibrium modelisation.
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2.2 Elucidating the “Keynesian” modifier
In his 1988 paper criticising the new classical approach, Blinder draws the following
distinction between normative and positive Keynesianism.
The division of Keynesian economics into positive and normative components is central
to  understanding  both  the  academic  debate  and  its  relevance  to  policy.  Positive
Keynesianism is a matter of scientific judgement. A positive Keynesian believes that
both monetary and fiscal policy can change aggregate demand, that fluctuations in
aggregate demand have real effects, and that prices and wages do not move rapidly to
clear markets. No policy prescriptions follow from these beliefs alone. … Normative
Keynesians add both value judgement and political judgement to the preceding list. A
normative Keynesian believes that government should use its leverage over aggregate
demand to reduce the amplitude of business cycles. He or she is probably far more
interested in filling in cyclical throughs than in shaving off peaks. These normative
propositions are based on judgements that (a) macroeconomic fluctuations significantly
reduce social welfare, (b) the government is knowledgeable and capable enough to
improve upon free-market outcomes, and (c) unemployment is a more important
problem than inflation (Blinder 1988: 112-3)
Blinder’s insight can be cast differently by drawing a distinction between a theoretical
framework or apparatus, on the one hand, and the “policy cause” which it may serve, on the
other.  The  “Keynesian  apparatus”  term  then  refers  to  what  Blinder  calls  “positive
Keynesianism”, the  “ Keynesian policy cause” label to his “normative Keynesianism”.
Most commentators will agree that the IS-LM model is the Keynesian theoretical framework
par excellence – for sure, it has been the most influential translation of Keynes’s in prose
reasoning into a model. But the ‘Keynesian’ modifier can also be used in reference to what6
motivated Keynes to write the General Theory. In this line, it can be viewed as a catchword
for regrouping authors who think that, for all its virtues, the market economy can exhibit
market failures, which state interventions, in particular demand stimulation, are able to
remedy upon. The laissez-faire policy cause, which pleads against such interventions, can
then be viewed as the non-Keynesian or anti-Keynesian policy cause.
In an interview with Foley, Leontief remarked that in his opinion Keynes developed his
theory essentially as an instrument to support his policy advice (1998: 122). Put crudely, my
viewpoint is that this observation extends beyond Keynes’ person and applies to Keynesians
and anti-Keynesians (in the policy cause sense) alike. Moreover, I think that there is nothing
to be blamed about such an attitude.
To further compound the matter, no one-to-one relationship exists between the Keynesian
framework and the Keynesian policy cause or between the non-Keynesian framework and the
anti-Keynesian policy cause. While the launching of the Keynesian apparatus was motivated
by the will to support the Keynesian policy cause, authors who were anti-Keynesian from a
policy perspective – Milton Friedman being the emblematic example – were able to subvert it
and use it as a weapon for the laissez-faire cause. Thus, Friedman, although being anti-
Keynesian from the policy cause perspective, must be considered a Keynesian author
methodologically speaking – i.e., in so far as the modifier refers to the theoretical apparatus
dimension.  Likewise, while the non-Keynesian conceptual apparatus, to be associated with
new classical economics, was initiated by authors wanting to defends the anti-Keynesian
policy cause, this does not exclude the possibility of it becoming subverted in its turn. This is
the very task that New Keynesian economists set themselves forth. Against my distinction,
they are non-Keynesian from the theoretical framework viewpoint yet Keynesian from the
policy cause perspective.
3 The Marshall-Walras divide
The standard view about the Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches, the former being
narrowed down to Book V of the Principles, is that they are complementary.
9 They share the
same subjective theory of value grounding market supply and demand functions in agents’
optimising behaviour. Moreover, a division of labour seems to be existing between them, with
Marshallian theory focusing on the study of isolated parts of the economy and Walrasian
theory  on  the  study  of  the  economy  as  a  whole.  The  latter  then  appears  to  be  the
generalisation of the former.
10
                                                   
9 It is e.g. expressed in Hicks ([1934] 1983: 86).
10 Marshall’s only foray in the study of general equilibrium was in his Mathematical Notes XIV and XXI (on
this, see Dimand (1990). Why did he not try harder to develop a theory as to the functioning of the economy as a7
Following Clower and Leijonhufvud (Clower and Leijonhufvud 1975, Leijonhufvud 1999), I
dissent from this view. I share their belief that there is room for a Marshallian general
equilibrium approach that is distinct from the Walrasian. Moreover, like them, I am of the
opinion that the possible emergence of alternatives to Walrasian general equilibrium theory is
a matter of trade technology, i.e. the institutional set-up enabling equilibrium outcomes to be
arrived at.
If it were accepted that the exclusive issue economic theory needs to address is that of the
logical existence of equilibrium, then the matter would be sealed: no need for an alternative
theoretical construction exists. Walras paved the way to solving it and Arrow and Debreu
finalised the job by constructing the benchmark general equilibrium model. To all intents and
purposes most economists have no qualm with such a restricted approach. Yet, economic
theory cannot limit itself to the issues of the logical existence and stability of equilibrium.
Trade technology must be taken in earnest.
3.1 The Walrasian trade technology
One of Walras’ strokes of genius was to have started his analysis with considering an entire
economy at once, rather than a section of it. A Walrasian economy constitutes a single
centralised market, encompassing every agent and every good and service. The auctioneer,
though not explicitly introduced by Walras in the Elements  of  Pure  Economics,  is  the
cornerstone of the Walrasian trade technology (De Vroey 1998). His main task consists of
using the price system in order to make individual trade offers compatible. To this end, he
announces price vectors to which agents react by expressing the optimal quantity they offer to
trade. Prices are changed until general equilibrium is reached – i.e. whenever every market
excess demand is nil or negative, the price being equal to zero in the latter case. Most general
equilibrium theorists who recognise the auctioneer’s role only grudgingly and openly declare
their disliking. In contrast, I think that it is integral to the neo-Walrasian research programme.
To say it bluntly and at the risk of raising the eyebrows of important commentators of Walras,
such as Walker (1996), as well as of many present-day Walrasian theorists – yet not Lucas
(see Lucas 1986) – the Walrasian approach cannot dispense with the auctioneer, because it is
the only working trade technology assumption on stock.
This being granted, the need for making explicit the whereabouts of the auctioneer-led
tâtonnement  process  cannot  be  side-stepped.  On  top  of  what  I  already  stated,  other
characteristics are worth mentioning. The formation of equilibrium proceeds in one stroke,
involving all goods and agents. At each trade round everything occurs simultaneously. Actual
                                                                                                                                                                   
whole? Two possible answers come to the mind. First, he might have considered that this subject-matter was not
concrete enough. Second, he might have been aware that the tools for such a study were unavailable.8
transactions remain suspended until the equilibrium price vector is arrived at. Although there
is less consensus on this point, I am of the opinion that a Walrasian economy is basically non-
monetary, in spite of the existence of a numéraire-good.
11 Another point that needs to be
clarified is the information structure. In the canonical Walrasian or neo-Walrasian model,
agents are supposed to hold perfect information over the prices announced by the auctioneer,
the quality of goods and services, and the states of the world. However, due to the presence of
the auctioneer, they are not supposed to be knowledgeable over other agents’ demand and
supply functions, nor over the factors underpinning them. All this still makes for a quite
heroic information assumption yet, as will be seen, it is less heroic that the informational
assumption underpinning Marshallian theory. Finally, consider the communication structure
of an auctioneer-led system. The auctioneer economy is a set of bilateral relationships
between the auctioneer and isolated individual agents. Before the attainment of equilibrium,
agents’ exclusive social link is with the auctioneer. They do not interact and communicate
between them. Nor, as stated, are they cognisant about excess demand functions and the data
that underpin them. An important implication ensues. Whenever a given agent makes a
trading offer by responding to the prices announced by the auctioneer, he ignores how many
other agents are making an offer similar to his. This means that an agent can be in a
monopolistic position whilst being totally unaware and hence incapable of taking advantage
of  it!  In  other  words,  the  tâtonnement  set-up  itself  guarantees  the  "perfectness”  of
competition, whatever the possible monopolistic factors that may be present in the economy.
Agents cannot influence prices because the institutional device is such as to preclude it.
12 The
auctioneer hypothesis and imperfect competition, it turns out, are incompatible bedfellows.
3. 2 Extending the Marshallian trade technology to the economy as a whole
Imagine that Walras never wrote his Elements, and that only Marshall’s writings were
available for economists wanting to build a general equilibrium theory.
13
Marshall gave implicitly a clue as how to proceed. Walras’ decision to study an entire
economy from the onset was counter-intuitive. Intuitively, one would rather take a stepwise
approach consisting of studying the functioning of an isolated typical market in the first stage
of the enterprise while relegating the study of the interrelationship of markets, the piecing
                                                   
11 This is clear for what concerns the Arrow-Debreu model. It is likewise so for Walras’ Elements in so far as it is
accepted that Walras’ introduction of money in his model of circulation and money does not stand up scrutiny
(cf. Bridel 1997). On the other hand, starting with Patinkin (1965), a line of authors have claimed to have
successfully introduced money in Walrasian theory, yet this claim has been refuted by Hahn ([1965] 1969) (cf.
Bridel 2002). Turning to present-day theory, money is present under the form of cash-in-advance in some new
classical models, yet again it can be argued that its introduction is contrived.
12 De Vroey (1998) argues that they are unable to manipulate the auctioneer.
13 In fact, this was the position Keynes was facing because of the wide ignorance of Walrasian theory amongst
Cambridge economists.9
together  of  the  results  of  partial  analysis,  for  its  second  stage.  This  two-tier  general
equilibrium methodology can be considered typically Marshallian in contrast to the one-shot
Walrasian methodology. Its gist is well encapsulated in Hicks’ following observation – a
statement that Walras would not have uttered:
If a model of the whole economy is to be securely based, it must be grounded in an
intelligible account of how a single market is supposed to work (Hicks, 1965: 78).
14
Extrapolating from the institutional set-up upon which Marshall’s partial equilibrium analysis
is based, we can reconstruct the trade technology that would have underpinned his general
equilibrium analysis had he been able to construct it, thereby defining the contours of a
Marshallian economy to be contrasted with the Walrasian economy. A first feature is that the
economy is depicted as composed of separate markets of different sub-types (factors, final
goods, etc.). Each of them is an autonomous locus of formation of equilibrium. Another of its
features is its monetary character, each market witnessing to an exchange between one given
good and money. Contrary to what is the case for Walrasian theory, a non-monetary
Marshallian model can hardly be conceived of. As far as price-setting is concerned, no
auctioneer is assumed to be present. Agents are price-makers. This goes along with a stronger
information assumption, a point that requires more elaboration.
Like in the Walrasian set-up, perfect information is supposedly present, yet it receives a
stronger contents. In so far as the auctioneer is absent from the Marshallian scenario, the
burden of the formation of equilibrium now lies on economic agents. They need to assess
relevant market supply and demand functions on their own. Therefore, they must be informed
about the relevant private data. Perfect information in this stronger meaning turns out to be
the linchpin of the equilibrium formation process. In short, the agents participating in the
market are supposed to be as omniscient about it as the outside model-builder economist.
15
Once this omniscience feature is brought to the forefront, which is scarcely the case, the
conclusion must be drawn that the Marshallian trade technology fares hardly better than the
Walrasian in terms of realism. Both are based on a deus ex machina, perfect information in
one case, the auctioneer in the other. Perfect information is no less a betrayal of the alleged
theoretical explanandum, a decentralised trading system, than the auctioneer, because the
hallmark  of  a  decentralised  economy  is  that  private  data  will  not  become  public.
Methodologically, the underlying flaw is that two levels of knowledge, which should have
                                                   
14 The following other statement is in the same vein: “ What we have to do now is to generalize his [Marshall’s]
framework, so that it can e used for the discussion of the problems of a whole economic system” (Hicks 1965:
121).
15 Cf. De Vroey (2003).10
been kept separate – the knowledge of the outside omniscient economist and that of the
economic agent – have become blurred.
16
The result obtained up to now is as follows. Assume a Marshallian theorist, endowed with the
conceptual toolbox to be found in Book V of the Principles and wanting to study the economy
as a whole. He would face the need to put forward some scenario as to the functioning of the
economy. What I have done is to spell it out. Clearly enough the Marshallian trade technology
is different from the Walrasian. Five differences stand out.
1)  A single all-encompassing market in the Walrasian approach versus a juxtaposition of
separate markets in the Marshallian approach;
2)  Prices are formed by the auctioneer in the Walrasian approach while agents are price-
makers in the Marshallian approach;
3)  Money is absent from the Walrasian approach ( if present, it is introduced in a
contrived way) while it is an essential ingredient of the Marshallian; put differently the
Marshallian economy, unlike the Walrasian, is necessarily monetary.
4)  In the Walrasian approach perfect information does not include agents’ ability to
reconstruct market supply and demand function, while this requirement is needed for
the formation of equilibrium in the Marshallian approach.
5)  The Walrasian trade technology excludes imperfect competition (i.e. the possibility of
monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour) while there is no reason for this exclusion in
the Marshallian approach.
17
4 The unfolding of macroeconomics viewed against the background of the Marshall-
Walras divide
4.1 The overall picture
I am now able to address the issue of the relevance of the Marshall-Walras divide for
explaining the history of macroeconomics. My claim is that macroeconomics started as
Marshallian but became Walrasian after the new classical revolution. To make my point, let
me  confront  the  state  of  development  of  general  equilibrium  theory,  including
macroeconomics as its simplified sub-type, at two points in time, first, at the heyday of the IS-
LM tradition, say in the 1950s and 1960s, and second at the turn of the century. Tables 1 and
                                                   
16 This is a point that Hayek underlined more than half a century ago, unfortunately with little impact. Cf. Hayek
([1937] 1948: 45).
17 Perfect competition should not be equated with price-taking behaviour. It can also be associated with price-
making behaviour. Hence my criteria (2) and (5) are not identical.11
2, which display a few potential lines of development of general equilibrium theory in a tree
form, serve this purpose. Four nodes are separated. The first is a bifurcation between
Marshallian and Walrasian general equilibrium, the second separates complex from simplified
models. A further distinction, which is relevant only for the Marshallian approach, is between
perfectly and imperfectly competitive models. Finally, a last node is between static and
dynamic models, dynamics meaning here intertemporal.
Insert tables 1 and 2
Table 1 shows that during the first period the Marshallian and the Walrasian research
programmes were in an inverse position. I shall argue presently that the IS-LM model is
Marshallian. This being granted, it turns out that the Marshallian programme succeeded in
constructing simplified general equilibrium models (macroeconomics) yet no Marshallian
complex general equilibrium models were existing. The inverse is true for the Walrasian
programme:  no  Walrasian  macroeconomics  was  existing,  except  for  Patinkin  and  the
disequilibrium approach, yet the complex part of the Walrasian programme was alive and
well.
Table 2 reflects the present situation. The difference with the earlier situation is that most of
the empty slots have been filled up. The IS-LM model has been supplemented with important
developments in the imperfect competition branch. For example, I take Hart 1979’s model as
a  fine  example  of  a  complex  Marshallian  general  equilibrium  model  with  imperfect
competition. Moreover, dynamic imperfect competition models have emerged.
18 As far as the
Walrasian  branch  is  concerned,  the  salient  feature  is  the  breakthrough  of  Walrasian
macroeconomics with real business cycle models.
                                                   
18 See for example Benassy (2002).12
4.2 The IS-LM model
The IS-LM model is often, yet offhandedly, characterised as Walrasian.
19 I will show that this
judgement is mistaken. But before let me consider two possible reasons that may have led to
put forward such a judgement. A first one is that general equilibrium is equated with
Walrasian theory. This was for example Patinkin's stance. He rightly perceived that Keynes’
project amounted to study the interdependency across markets. Since he did not conceive of
any alternative to the Walrasian route, he concluded that Keynes had unwittingly followed
Walras’ footsteps.
20 I have shown that such a stance is inappropriate.  As soon as it is admitted
that the Walrasian approach is not the exclusive way of doing general equilibrium analysis,
Patinkin’s conclusion falls.
A second reason is that Hicks, the initiator of the IS-LM tradition ([1937] 1967), is considered
a Walrasian economist – at least, he supposedly was when writing his « Mr. Keynes and the
‘Classics’ ». This was also the period during which he was working on Value and Capital
(1946 ; first edition 1939), which is often credited for having revived Walrasian theory. Hence
the conclusion that IS-LM must be Walrasian as well. The snag, however, is that Value and
Capital is less Walrasian than it usually claimed. In my opinion, Hicks was never more than a
half-hearted Walrasian. He may well have considered that Walrasian theory opened a window
on new horizons ([1979] 1983: 358), yet he always read Walras through Marshallian glasses.
Contrary to subsequent Walrasians, he did not want to limit his analysis to the study of the
logical existence of equilibrium. Following Marshall’s lead, he confined mathematical
developments to the appendices of his book. Nor was he ready to adopt the auctioneer
hypothesis. Marshall was to him a better reference for studying the working of markets than
Walras. Finally, as seen, his general equilibrium methodology was different from the
Walrasian. All in all, Hicks’ mistake lies in his failure to have envisaged that Marshall and
Walras were in a relationship of discontinuity. Unfortunately, most of the profession followed
suit.
To assess whether the IS-LM model belongs to the Marshallian or the Walrasian approach,
we must see how it fares with respect to the criteria adopted above to differentiate the
Marshallian and the Walrasian trade technologies – the structure of the economy, the price-
                                                   
19 See e.g. Vercelli (2000). This view is also taken for granted in several of the contributions to the Young-
Zilberfarb volume on IS-LM (2000).
20 « Thus a basic contribution of the General Theory is that it is in effect the first practical application of the
Walrasian theory of general equilibrium : ‘practical’ not in the sense of empirical … but in the sense of reducing
Walras’  formal  model  of  n  simultaneous  equations  in  n  unknowns  to  a  manageable  model  form  which
implications for the real world could be drawn » (Patinkin 1987 : 27). « The analysis of the General Theory is
essentially that of general equilibrium. The voice is that of Marshall, but the hands are those of Walras. And in
his IS-LM interpretation of the General Theory, Hicks quite rightly and quite effectively concentrated on the
hands » (ditto 1987 : 35).13
making process, the role of money, the information assumption and the admissibility of
imperfect competition.
21
As far as the first criterion is concerned, the matter is clear. The economy that the IS-LM
model analyses is composed of markets that function separately, each of them being an
autonomous locus of equilibrium. Likewise, for what concerns the second criterion, no
auctioneer is supposedly present. The monetary character of an IS-LM economy is also
undeniable. Turning to the information assumption, it is true that accounts of the IS-LM
model scarcely evoke the possibility that it might rest on the assumption that agents are
omniscient. But then nobody seems to have raised the issue of how equilibrium is arrived at in
this model.
22 The IS curve describes every combination of income and interest at which the
goods market is clearing, the same is true about the LM curve with respect to the money
market. Nothing is stated about how these market clearing results are arrived at.
23 What is
even more perplexing is how the intersection of the IS-LM curves can be obtained. I see no
other explanation than assuming agents’ ability to reconstruct the equilibrium values of the
economy, i.e. their being omniscient! 
24
Two supplementary factors point to a Marshallian belonging. First, it has often been remarked
that the IS-LM model has little room for expectations.
25 To me, this lack is due to the
stationary equilibrium conception, underpinning the Marshallian approach and centred on the
distinction between market prices and normal prices with normal equilibrium serving as a
centre of gravitation.
26  This conception of equilibrium is based on a central yet unnoticed
assumption, namely that the economic data remain constant over the period of analysis,
except for shocks that are supposed to be accidental, reversible and unpredictable. Now if
shocks cannot be predicted (although once they have occurred, agents are supposed to be able
to assess their effect and length correctly), and if, moreover, their impact is supposedly well
circumscribed, so that all the other data of economy remain unchanged, why on earth would
                                                   
21 As the last criterion is irrelevant here, this leaves us with the first four.
22 This issue was dodged because it was believed, certainly by Hicks, that Marshall’s haggling and bargaining
mechanism would do the job. In De Vroey (2003), I have claimed that this argumentation is hollow.
23 In his study of Modigliani’s 1944 IS-LM model, Rubin (2004, this volume) shows that Modigliani was
concerned with the formation of equilibrium. However, the fact that in Modigliani’s reasoning the adjustment
took place exclusively in the money market, requiring no across markets changes, is further testimony to the
Marshallian character of the IS-LM model.
24 One might claim that the equilibrium can as be attained by adopting the auctioneer assumption, in which case
the IS-LM could be viewed as based, at least in this respect, on the Walrasian trade technology. Upon reflection
it turns out that this will not do. Either it is accepted that markets function separately, in which case an
auctioneer per market would be present. Yet how will one of the local auctioneers, say the auctioneer in charge
of the goods markets, be able to determine which among the possible equilibria between savings and investment
will the ‘true’ one? To this end, he should come in touch with the other auctioneer, which makes the story too
contrived. Or it assumed that a single auctioneer takes the care of the economy as a whole. But then idea of
separate markets ceases to make sense.
25 See e.g. King (1993).
26 Cf. De Vroey (1999).14
one bother about expectations? In order for these to become important, economic data must
be constantly changing over time. Turning to the second factor, different enrichments were
brought to the initial IS-LM model, pertaining to consumption, portfolio choice, investment
and the labour market. All of them consisted of analysing one sector of the economy viewed
in  isolation  from  the  others,  thereby  witnessing  to  the  Marshallian  two-step  general
equilibrium methodology evoked above.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the IS-LM model is a simplified Marshallian general
equilibrium model. This conclusion is in accordance with the implicit view taken by most
defenders of IS-LM macroeconomists. In spite of their unawareness of the Marshall-Walras




According to Leijonhufvud, the development of economic theory can be thought of as
forming a decision tree.
It is useful to think of our subject as forming a decision tree. Major economists force
their contemporaries to face choices – choices of what to ask, what to assume, what to
regard as evidence and what methods and models to employ – and persuade the
profession or some faction of it to follow the choice they make. The path that any
particular school has followed traces a sequence of such decisions. Many of the choices
faced in such a sequence were not anticipated by the founder to which we trace the
development in question, by were created by subsequent contributors; some of the
decisions made we may judge to have been ‘wrong’ in hindsight (Leijonhufvud 1994:
148).
These remarks are apposite for reflecting on the place of Patinkin’s Money, Interest and
Prices, (first edition 1956, second edition 1965) in the history of macroeconomics. This book,
which aimed at integrating value analysis and money theory, comprised a simplified general
equilibrium model with two variants, a classical and a Keynesian, that can be put on the same
footing as the IS-LM model. Arguably, it is superior to it in several respects –  its composing
markets are better defined, it has stronger micro-foundations, its adjustment process involves
all the commodities forming the economy.
28 When Patinkin’s model is gauged against my five
criteria for separating the Marshallian from the Walrasian trade technology, its Walrasian
belonging stands out, except for money. Yet Patinkin hardly pushed it that way. Not that he
                                                   
27 See e.g. Lipsey (2000: 69).
28 Cf. Rubin (2004, this volume). Small wonder then that it was hailed by Lucas in the introduction to this
volume.15
was unaware of the Walrasian character of his model. The contrary is true. But he missed the
un-Walrasian nature of the IS-LM model and hence the deep-seated contrast between the two
models! Although his book exerted an important influence, it was considered as a contribution
to monetary theory rather than to macroeconomics. As a result, the fact that it might constitute
an alternative to the IS-LM was disregarded. Patinkin’s insights were re-discovered a few
decades later by the authors of the so-called disequilibrium approach (Barro and Grossman
1971, 1976). Yet, its success was short-lived, many of its practitioners ending up admitting to
the validity of the criticism levelled against it – that its cornerstone, the idea of price rigidity,
was ill-grounded..
To conclude, Walrasian macroeconomics could have emerged as an alternative to the IS-LM
way of modelling, first in the 1950s with Patinkin’s model, and later with the disequilibrium
line of research, yet this possibility  failed to be realised.
4.4 2.3 The neoclassical synthesis
Several authors, in particular Goodfriend and King (1997), have claimed that the unfolding of
macroeconomics has led to the emergence of a New Neoclassical Synthesis close in spirit to
the neoclassical synthesis that prevailed in the 1960s. Hence the need to clarify the contents of
the “old” synthesis.
The term ‘neoclassical synthesis’ is often traced back to Samuelson’s 1955 edition of his
Economics textbook, yet what he writes there is hardly instructive.
29 For a more substantive
explanation, we may turn to Howitt’s or Blanchard’s entries in the New Palgrave Dictionary
or to Woodford (1999). All of them hold the same viewpoint well summarised in the
following quotation from Howitt:
Since it was widely believed that wages were less than fully flexible in the short run, it
seemed natural to see Keynesian theory as applying to short run fluctuations and general
equilibrium theory as applying to long-run questions in which adjustment problems
could safely be ignored. This view came to be known as the ‘neoclassical synthesis.
(Howitt, 1987 : 274).
30
The problem lies in what should be understood by the term “synthesis”. Strictly speaking, a
synthesis refers to the process by which two theoretical analytical frameworks that at a certain
                                                   
29 “In recent years 90 percent of American economists have stopped being ‘Keynesian economists’ or ‘anti-
Keynesian  economists’.  Instead  they  have  worked  towards  a  synthesis  of  whatever  is  valuable  in  older
economics and in modern theories of income determination. The result might be called neo-classical synthesis
and is accepted in its broad outlines by all but about 5 per cent of extreme left wing and right wing writers “
(Samuelson 1955 : 212).
30  See also Blanchard (1987: 634-5).16
stage were considered as antagonistic eventually turn out to be congruent. Hence a merger
between them proves possible.
31
The neoclassical synthesis as understood by Howitt et alii does not stand up to this strict
understanding of the notion of synthesis. Actually, their conception expresses a Keynesian
viewpoint, which “Classicists” have no reason to endorse. The classical model has as much to
say about the short period as the Keynesian – actually it has a rival theory to propose about it.
Therefore, classicists should have refused the territorial partition that Keynesians were
proposing.
32 In short, the so-called neoclassical synthesis was a meta-theoretical compromise
between two approaches that did not want to enter into an open intellectual fight rather than a
synthesis in the strict sense of the term.
4.5 Monetarism
Monetarism is associated with the work of Milton Friedman and his criticism of Keynesian
activist policy. At a certain juncture, it was believed that monetarism could become a new
paradigm, rival to the Keynesian.
33 At present, a different view prevails. For example,
Woodford  thinks  that  monetarism  has  won  the  day  in  bringing  monetary  policy  and
expectations to the forefront, yet he considers that, from a methodological viewpoint, it has
been absorbed within the Keynesian paradigm (Woodford 1999: 18). Likewise, Snowdon and
Vane write that “monetarist influences were absorbed within the existing framework leading
to a Keynesian-monetarist synthesis” (Snowdon and Vane 1996: 386). Finally, Lipsey (2000)
views the difference between monetarists and Keynesian as being mainly rhetorical (Lipsey
2000: 68).
Although making this point would require an article on its own, Friedman’s contribution
should not be viewed as a rejection of Keynes’ methodology. Let me just evoke three
elements of justification. First, Keynes and Friedman shared the same style of theorising and a
common belonging to the Marshallian connection.
 34 Friedman praised Keynes for being “a
true Marshallian in method” and for adopting the Marshallian instead of the Walrasian
framework (1974: 18)!
35 Second, when request to put his claim in a broader theoretical
                                                   
31 The identity of the involved streams should made clear. Thus one should speak of the synthesis between theory
A and B. In this respect the neoclassical synthesis appellation is wanting.
32 The point that it is logically inconsistent to be a “Keynesian” in the short period and a “new classicist” in the
long period, was already made by Lucas in his Tobin and Monetarism review article (1981).
33 Cf. Johnson (1971).
34 On this see Hirsch and de Marchi (1990) chapter 9, Dostaler (1998) and Hammond (1992).
35  The  following  excerpt  from  his  "Marshallian  Demand  Curve"  illustrates:  “Of  course,  it  would  be  an
overstatement to characterise all modern economic theory as 'Walrasian' in this sense. For example, Keynes'
theory of employment, whatever its merits or demerits on other grounds, is Marshallian in method. It is a
general equilibrium theory containing important empirical content and constructed to facilitate meaningful
predictions” ( Friedman [1949] 1953: 92).17
perspective the model on which Friedman fell back was the IS-LM model (Friedman 1974).
Third,  as  claimed  in  De  Vroey  (2001),  Friedman’s  conception  of  expectation  in  his
expectations-augmented Phillips Curve model must be characterised as Marshallian rather
than as Walrasian.
The distinction between Keynesianism as a theoretical apparatus and Keynesianism as a
defence of policy activism must come into play at this juncture. Friedman’s aim was to
reverse Keynesian policy conclusions. Yet he did hardly feel it necessary to overthrow the
Keynesian theoretical apparatus, contrary to what Lucas and Sargent had in mind ten years
later (1978). In short, Friedman should be considered as Keynesian from the methodological
viewpoint and as anti-Keynesian from the policy viewpoint. In Blinder’s words:
The long and to some extent continuing battle between Keynesians and monetarists, you
will note, has been primarily fought over the normative  issues …. Thus, by my
definition, most monetarists are positive Keynesians, but not normative Keynesians.
…The briefer, but more intense, debate between Keynesians and new classicals had, by
contrast, been fought primarily over the tenets of positive Keynesianism (Blinder : 112-
3).
I have argued that what was called the neoclassical synthesis should not be considered a real
synthesis. In contrast, it can be claimed that such an integration has taken place for what
concerns the relationship between monetarism and the IS-LM model. 
36 No deep conceptual
opposition divides the IS-LM framework and monetarism. The irony of this state of affairs
should, however, not go unnoticed. On the one hand, the reconciliation between Keynesian
and monetarists had to wait for the emergence of a common foe, the new classical paradigm.
On the other, its counter-part has been a split between “old” and “new” Chicago, the former
being Marshallian, the latter Walrasian.
37 In this light, the terminology that was used at the
time, separating “Monetarism I” (à la Friedman) from “Monetarism II” (à la Lucas) reveals
itself inappropriate. The use of the same substantive suggests that these two models belong to
a same programme. If my interpretation is accepted, the contrary is true, Friedman’s work
belonging to the Marshallian approach while Lucas’ is Walrasian.
                                                   
36 The well-known Laidler-Tobin debate in the Economic Journal (Laidler 1981, Tobin 1981) illustrates.
37 Snowdon and Vane’s interviews of Friedman and Lucas are enlightening in this respect. Question [to Lucas]:
You  acknowledge  that  Friedman  has  had  a  great  influence  on  you,  yet  his  methodological  approach  is
completely different to your own approach to macroeconomics. Why did his methodological approach not
appeal to you? Answer: I like mathematics and general equilibrium theory. Friedman didn’t.... Question: His
methodological approach seems more in keeping with Keynes and Marshall. Answer: He describes himself as
Marshallian, although I don’t know quite what it means. Whatever it is, it’s not what I think of myself (1998,
132). Question [to Friedman]: Kevin Hoover has drawn a methodological distinction between your work as
Marshallian and that of Robert Lucas as Walrasian. Is that distinction valid? Answer: There is a great deal to
that. On the whole I believe that is probably true. I have always distinguished between the Marshallian approach
and the Walrasian approach. I have always been personally a Marshallian (1997: 202).18
4.6 The unnoticed emergence of Marshallian general equilibrium theory
Has the Marshallian general equilibrium line ever been pursued? The quick answer to this
question is “No”. Evidently, no well-established Marshallian general equilibrium theory has
seen the day. Yet this should not be the last word of it. First of all, attention should be given
to programmes that exist only in an inchoate way. The first name to be mentioned here is that
of Keynes. He had a reason for making the step of studying the economy as a whole that
Marshall did not have, his interest in mass unemployment and his insight that, although the
problem manifested itself in the labour market, its origin was to be looked for in other parts of
the economy. Such an insight required to study the interdependency across apparently
unrelated markets (the labour market and the money market) and thus to engage into general
equilibrium analysis. Therefore the General Theory (1936) can be viewed as an attempt at
building a Marshallian general equilibrium theory. Other authors who set forth the task of
building a Marshallian general equilibrium theory are Clower and Leijonhufvud (Cf. Clower
and Leijonhufvud 1975). They had in mind a radically different way of studying the
coordination  of  economic  activities,  abandoning  the  study  of  the  logical  existence  of
equilibrium to concentrate on economic processes and institutions. They also suggested
abandoning  optimising  behaviour.  Yet,  for  all  its  appeal,  Clower  and  Leijonhufvud’s
programme has had trouble to taking off.
38
Moreover and somewhat oddly, we must consider the possibility that Marshallian general
equilibrium theory exists yet only in disguise. What needs to be envisaged is that models,
which are presented as amending the canonical Walrasian model, are in fact built on a radically
different trade technology. This might occur with neither their builders nor their users being
aware of it, due to their focusing on problems of logical existence of equilibrium and their
neglecting the trade technology dimension. I have here in mind imperfect competition general
equilibrium models.
39
Authors developing such models have rightly noted that the equilibrium they obtain are non-
Walrasian, differing from the equilibrium that would be arrived at if perfect competition had
been prevailing. However, the question to be raised is that of the trade technology upon which
their models are based. Is it Walrasian –  one can get a non-Walrasian equilibrium outcome
within a Walrasian trade technology, to wit Drèze (1975) –  or non-Walrasian in the radical
sense, pointed out above in section 2.1, of a trade technology that is radically distinct from the
Walrasian. Unfortunately, imperfect competition theorists have hardly reflected on this issue.
                                                   
38 Their programme has recently received a new impulse in the works of a group of economists centred around
David Colander (Colander 1996). Oddly, enough, these authors call their approach “Post Walrasian”, while in
terms of methods it is poles apart from Walras. “Neo-Marshallian” would have been a better brand, reference
being then made to “Marshall the evolutionist”.
39 Pioneering works in this line were Negishi (1961) and Gabszewicz and Vial (1972).Cf. De Vroey (2003).19
The Walrasian perfect competition model has served as the benchmark for several types of
developments, the latter proceeding usually through the introduction of imperfections.
Missing markets, externalities, information imperfections, price rigidities are all lines that
have been taken. All of them have proven compatible with the auctioneer trade technology.
Would imperfect competition then be just another of such departures? No! All imperfections
cannot be put on the same footing. My above remark on the working of a auctioneer
economy, stating that Walrasian models necessarily are perfectly competitive models points
to the contrary. Now, if general equilibrium models exists that cannot be considered as
belonging  to  the  Walrasian  approach,  this  means  that  another  way  of  doing  general
equilibrium is present. Hence my claim that imperfectly competitive general equilibrium
models belong to the Marshallian rather than to the Walrasian approach. They are based on
the Marshallian representation of the working of the economy. Take Hart’s (1979, 1982),
Blanchard and Kyotaki’s (1987), Benassy’s (2002) models and look at them against the grid
of my opposition between the two types of trade technology. They all feature the Marshallian
traits instead of the Walrasian ones. In short, while most models that are called “non-
Walrasian” should better be called “quasi-Walrasian”, imperfect competition models are
really “non-Walrasian”.
As soon as it is accepted that trade technology matters, the view that Walrasian perfect
competition theory is the base camp for imperfectly competitive general equilibrium models
must be abandoned.
40 Admittedly, it looks odd to claim that these models are a departure from
the Marshallian perfectly competitive general equilibrium model if the latter is non-existing.
The way out is to consider that the builders of these models have constructed a Marshallian
perfectly competitive general equilibrium result inadvertently, as in passim. It is to be found
in those passages of their papers where they substitute the assumption of a great number of
agents to that of a monopolistic or of oligopolistic agents. Then, one falls back on a Walrasian
equilibrium, i.e. the array of prices and quantities that the auctioneer would have made
emerge. However here these equilibrium values result from the Marshallian trade technology
rather than from the Walrasian.
4.7 The new classical revolution
Like everybody, I consider that Lucas’ work, especially his Expectations and the Neutrality of
Money paper ([1972] 1981), caused a radical breach. Interpreting it as having started a
Kuhnian scientific revolution seems to be no exaggeration. His motivation for writing this
article was to strengthen Friedman’s policy ineffectiveness claim by giving it stronger micro-
foundations and casting it in an explicit general equilibrium framework. Yet the end result
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was a methodological revolution blazing the trail for real business cycle theory and dynamic
macroeconomics (Sargent 1996). The shift from IS-LM to real business cycle models is
twofold: a move from a static to a dynamic approach, on the one hand, a shift from the
Marshallian to the Walrasian side of the tree, on the other.
Some commentators draw a divide between new classical and real business cycle models. I
rather consider them as representing two stages in the development of the same paradigm,
centred on stochastic dynamic equilibrium models. However, they differ in that Lucas’ model
is a parable with no claim to direct empirical confrontation while real business cycle models
claim to explain the real world.
41
The novelty of the new classical approach (defined in a broad way in order to encompass both
Lucas’ initial models and real business cycle models) can be accounted for in several ways.
Mine is as follows. Its distinctive feature lies in its having extended the scope of relevance of
value theory (i.e. the theory of equilibrium price) to a domain that before was believed to be
beyond its grasp.
42 Thereby it bridged a gulf that had marked economic theory for more than a
century, its split in two distinct branches, value or price theory, on the one hand, and business
cycle theory, on the other. Evolving at a high level of abstraction and concentrating on the
issue logical existence of equilibrium,   the first branch was based on trade technology
assumptions resulting in the ever existence of market clearing. The second consisted on
qualitative, descriptive accounts of the evolution of economies over time with only vague
references to equilibrium, what allowed it to integrate phenomena such as market rationing
that had no room in value theory.
43 Underlying this evolution is the abandonment of what was
the initial motivation of macroeconomics, i.e. bringing to the fore some malfunctioning of the
market system – after all, it was born in the aftermath of the Great Depression!
44
                                                   
41 In Woodford’s terms, “The real business cycle literature offered a new methodology, both for theoretical
analysis and for empirical testing. … It showed how such models [of the Lucas type] could be made quantitative,
emphasising the assignment of realistic numerical parameters values and the computation of numerical solutions
to the equations of the model, rather than being content with merely qualitative conclusions derived from more
general assumptions. The “equilibrium business cycle models” of Lucas had really only been parables; they
could not be regarded as literal descriptions of an economy, even allowing for the sort of idealisation that all
models of reality have.… Real business cycle models are instead quantitative models, that are intended to be
taken seriously as literal depictions of the economy, even if many details are abstracted from. The literature
emphasises the numerical predictions of the models, when parameter values are assigned on the basis of
measurement of the relevant aspects of an actual economy” (Woodford 1999 : 25-26).
42 Critics might say it has brought the imperialism of value theory to a new height.
43 A tempting way of putting the issue is to state that price theory was concerned with  equilibrium and business
cycle theory with disequilibrium. Yet this is misleading in so far as equilibrium and disequilibrium are part and
parcel. The truth is rather that these linked categories played only a marginal role in business cycle theory. The
latter, it was believed, was too complex a field of inquiry to be accounted for with the tools of price theory.
44 As aptly perceived by Hahn and Solow,“The irony is that macroeconomics began as the study of large-scale
economic pathologies: prolonged depressions, mass unemployment, persistent inflation, etc.  This focus was not
invented by Keynes (although the depression of the 1930s did not pass without notice). After all, most of
Haberler’s classic Prosperity and Depression is about ideas that were in circulation before The General Theory.
Now, at last, macroeconomic theory has as its central conception a model in which such pathologies are, strictly
speaking, unmentionable. There is no legal way to talk about them” (Hahn and Solow 1995:  2-3).21
Real business cycle theoreticians insist that their models belong to the Walrasian general
equilibrium approach. This is not to be denied. Yet a sharp contrast exists between Walrasian
models as they were existing before the rise of the new classical paradigm, pertaining to an
economy comprising a large number of agents and goods, and the new models based on the
assumption of a representative agent and the existence of a single good traded over time. This
evolution should be interpreted as a return to square one of Walras' construction dealing with
a the two-good exchange economy.
45 But then, this is exactly what macroeconomics is all
about, to work with simple rather than complex models! Hence my claim that real business
cycle  models  mark  the  start  of  Walrasian  macroeconomics  or,  more  precisely,  its
predominance, in view of the existence of earlier attempts.
This being stated, it may be wondered whether Walras himself would have endorsed the move
made by real business cycle theorists. When he started to write his Elements of Pure
Economics (1954, English translation) his intention was to construct a theory able to account
for the working of the competitive process in decentralised economies. However, he gradually
became aware of a conflict between the requirements of demonstrating the logical existence
of equilibrium states and any realistic account of the competitive process. Facing such a
dilemma, Walras opted for rigor over realism, and consequently refrained from claiming any
straightforward empirical relevance for his model, thereby foregoing his initial ambition.
46
The methodological implication was far-reaching. In particular, Walras came to believe that
the validity of his theory was not a matter of empirical relevance. The following extract,
drawn from an unpublished note written by Walras and criticising Pareto, is enlightening:
 Pareto believes that the aim of science is to ever come closer to reality through
successive approximations. I, for one, believe that the eventual aim of science is to
bring reality close to a certain ideal. This is why I formulate this ideal (Walras 2000:
567, own translation).
47
Subsequent neo-Walrasian economists have o all intents and purposes followed suit.
48
Authors such as Arrow, Debreu and Hahn have repeatedly insisted on the point that neo-
Walrasian general equilibrium theory is an abstract construction the strength of which lies in
                                                   
45 For a more detailed analysis, see De Vroey (2002).
46 As put by Jaffé, “The Elements  was intended to be and is, in all but the name, a realistic utopia, i.e. a
delineation of a state of affairs nowhere to be found in the actual world, independent of time and place, ideally
perfect in certain respects, and yet composed of realistic psychological and material ingredients” ([1980] 1983:
345).
47 Walras’ note is undated. Bridel’s conjecture is that it was written between 1896 and 1906. A similar  testimony
is Walras’ annotation on p. 17 of his copy of Cournot’s Principes de la théorie de la richesse, held at the Centre
Walras-Pareto of the Université de Lausanne, where he wrote “pure theory requires no confirmation from
reality” (“la théorie pure n’attend aucune confirmation de la réalité”), quoted in Baranzani. and Bridel (2003).
48 This assertion is true only for mathematical Walrasian economists. Other economists, who also claim a
Walrasian affiliation, like neo-Austrians or like Walker (1996), pull Walras towards the stationary equilibrium
perspective.22
the ability to posit issues in a rigorous way. Its main interest with respect to reality, they
argue, it to provide a negative benchmark. In short, they admit to a no bridge between their
theoretical construct and real-world market economies.
Real business cycle models mark a radical change in this respect by adopting the Friedman’s
methodological standpoint according to which models ought to be evaluated in terms of their
predictive capacity.
49  The validity of their models, they argue, ought to be assessed by
gauging their capacity to mimic real-world time-series.
The oddity, however, is that the gist of Friedman’s criticism of Walrasian economics was that
one could not jointly take into account the total set of interdependency across agents and
goods  and  have  a  tractable  model  allowing  for  predictions.  The  preference  of  many
economists for the Marshallian approach was probably based on their readiness to trade
rigorous  general  equilibrium  perspective  for  empirical  measurability.  In  other  words,
Friedman and lucid Walrasian authors at least concurred on one point, that one should not
turn  to  the  general  equilibrium  methodology  whenever  aiming  at  explaining  concrete
phenomena,. Why is it that what was true for the earlier Walrasian models – that higher rigor
had to be paid for by an admission to a lack of empirical relevance of the model – is no longer
so for even more rudimentary Walrasian models? Now, outwardly, there is no longer a price
to be paid for engaging in Walrasian theory: one can have the cake (Walrasian rigor) and
eating it (engaging empirical work) at the same time!
4.8 A New Neoclassical Synthesis?
Initially, dynamic macroeconomics was entirely non-Keynesian. This was true for both the
conceptual framework and the policy cause. Not surprisingly, the new classical attack on
Keynesian economics stirred up a revival of Keynesian thought, known as “New Keynesian
economics”. This label does not cover an unified theoretical programme. For example,
efficiency  wage  model  are  partial  equilibrium  models  (or  at  lest  started  this  way),
coordination  failure  models  can  be  Walrasian  yet  are  not  necessarily  so,  imperfect
competition models are Marshallian, etc. Moreover, the “New Keynesian” label is ambiguous
in that the Keynesian modifier should be understood exclusively in reference to the policy
cause dimension. It is inappropriate as far the theoretical framework is concerned.
                                                   
49 Although Lucas’ Neutrality of Money model still belongs to the “old” Walrasian tradition, since it has no
empirical counter-part, Lucas nonetheless endorses the real business cycle viewpoint. In their interview,
Snowdon and Vane asked him whether he “would agree that the appropriate criterion for establishing the
fruitfulness of a theory is the degree of empirical corroboration attained by its predictions?” Lucas’s answer was
“Something like that. Yes” and to the next question – ”You are Friedmanite on that issue of methodology?” – his
answer was affirmative. (1998: 132)23
Without commenting New Keynesian models any further, I want now to address the issue of
the New Synthesis. The particular branch of New Keynesian models that is of concern here is
imperfectly competitive general equilibrium models, which above I have characterised as
unwittingly belonging to the Marshallian research programme. Their hallmark is to combine
imperfect competition and price and wage stickiness in order to refute the Friedman-Lucas
ineffectiveness of monetary policy claim.
50 The idea of a merger between these models and
real business cycle models has been wholeheartedly endorsed by New Keynesians as the
following excerpt from Mankiw’s interview by Snowdon and Vane illustrates:
I’m delighted that some of the people who previously worked closely with the real
business cycle models are now trying to incorporate monetary effects in those models.
That provides a hope that somewhere down the line the new Keynesian models and the
real business cycle models are going to merge to some grand synthesis that incorporates
the strengths of both approaches (Snowdon and Vane 1994: 340).
Many New Keynesians share Mankiw’s viewpoint. Blanchard is amongst them. Rejecting any
picturing of the evolution of macroeconomics in terms of scientific revolution, he claims that
the passage from the IS-LM model to real business cycle models must be viewed as a smooth
evolutionary process.
On the surface, the history of macroeconomics appears as a series of battles, revolutions
and counterrevolutions.… But this would be the wrong image. The right one is of a
surprisingly steady accumulation of knowledge (Blanchard 2000: 2).
To him, the clash between “New Keynesians” and New Classicists” in the 1970s was short-
lived, and based on a misunderstanding.
In the early 1980s, macroeconomic research seemed divided in two camps, with sharp
ideological and methodological differences. Real business cycle theorists argued that
fluctuations could be explained in a fully competitive model, with technological shocks.
New Keynesians argued that imperfections were of the essence. Real business cycle
theorists used fully specified general equilibrium models based on equilibrium and
optimisation under uncertainty. New Keynesians used small models capturing what they
saw as the essence of their arguments, without the paraphernalia of fully specified
models. Today,   the ideological divide is gone. Not in the sense that underlying
ideological  differences  are  gone,  but  in  the  sense  that  trying  to  organise  recent
contributions along ideological lines would not work well. As I argued earlier, most
macroeconomic research today focuses on the macroeconomic implications of some
                                                   
50 See for example Blanchard and Kyotaki ([1987] 1991).24
imperfection or another. At the frontier of macro-economic research, the field is
surprisingly a-ideological (Blanchard 2000: 39).
51
Interestingly enough, the same viewpoint is held by some economists coming from what was
earlier viewed as the opposite camp. In particular, Goodfriend and King (1997) claim that in
the last ten years « macroeconomics is moving toward a New Neoclassical Synthesis »
(1997 : 231). Like Blanchard and Woodford, they praise the real business cycle  programme
for its micro-foundations and its allowing a comparison of alternative policies on the basis of
measures of utility benefits or costs. Like them, they argue that it must be enriched with the
considerations of imperfections, such as imperfect competition and sticky prices, the very
purpose of new neoclassical synthesis models. Under this heading, they put models that
« range from the flexible, small models of academic research to the new rational-expectations
policy model of the Federal Reserve Board » (1997 : 232). These models, which Goodfriend
and King view as close in spirit to the neoclassical synthesis that prevailed in the 1960s,
combine Keynesian elements – the above mentioned imperfections – and real business cycle
elements  –  intertemporal  optimisation,  rational  expectations,  and  their  integration  in
stochastic dynamic model (1997 : 232). These two components, they claim, are compatible
because of their shared reliance on microeconomics (1997 : 256). As far as policy is
concerned, they concur with New Keynesians in believing that “ aggregate demand must be
managed by monetary policy in order to deliver efficient macroeconomics outcomes”
(Goodfriend and King 1997: 255-6).
52
Has the so-called new synthesis the attributes of a real theoretical merger? At the present
juncture, this remains an open question. A positive answer would be appealing because it
would reveal that the reigns of the IS-LM paradigm and that of the new classical paradigm
have witnessed a similar evolution. On the score of the theoretical dimension, a two-step
evolution would have taken place, where two frameworks that used to be considered rivals
turn out to be compatible. On the score of the policy cause dimension, a shift would have
occurred from a situation where the policy cause and the theoretical framework seemed part
and parcel to a more open state of affairs in which the same conceptual framework proves
able to justify either the Keynesian or the laissez-faire policy cause.
True, a rallying around the real business cycle methodology has occurred. New Keynesian
authors have admitted that macroeconomics should study the dynamic evolution of the
economy in a stochastic context, rational expectations and intertemporal substitution being
furthermore considered sine qua non ingredients of the analysis. Likewise, most of them have
                                                   
51 Contrary to Blanchard, Woodford (1999) finds it useful to account for the history of macroeconomics in terms
of a succession of revolutions and counter-revolutions. However, he shares Blanchard’s and Mankiw’s opinion
that the future of macroeconomics lies in incorporating Keynesian features into real business cycle models
(Woodford 1999 : 29).
52 Hairault makes the same point (Hairault 1999: 616).25
abandoned the aim of demonstrating involuntary unemployment. On the other hand, two
arguments point against the achievement of the proposed synthesis. First, will the quid pro
quo that they new Keynesians are offering to new classicists – the rallying to the their
methodology against the introduction of the assumptions of imperfect competition and sticky
prices –be accepted? In other words, would prominent real business cycle theoreticians – say
Lucas or Prescott – be ready to sign any manifesto as to a merger between the two approaches
along the terms proposed by Goodfriend and King? I, for one, doubt it. “Chicago” (and for
that  matter,  Minnesota)  may  well  have  shifted  from  Marshall  to  Walras  yet,  as  well
documented by Leeson (2000), its resistance to imperfect competition is deep-rooted. Second,
if my above analysis is accepted, the perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive
models must be viewed as rooted in incompatible trade technologies, the Walrasian and the
Marshallian. Therefore a merger between them is hard to envisage. The picture which then
emerges is rather one of two rival macroeconomic paradigms, a Marshallian (i.e. imperfect
competition) and a Walrasian (i.e. perfect competition), existing side by side.
5 Concluding remarks
The starting point of this paper is my insight that any valid critical analysis of economic
theories must take into account the trade technology assumptions upon which they are based.
Interesting conclusions ensue. First, it turns out that the Marshallian and the Walrasian
approaches ought to be viewed as alternative research programmes because they rest on
radically different trade technologies. Second, the Marshall/Walras divide provides an
interesting angle of attack for reflecting on the history of macroeconomics, allowing for an
original interpretation of its recent unfolding. To wit, the new classical revolution, i.e. the
replacement of the IS-LM paradigm by stochastic dynamic models, can be interpreted as a
shift from Marshallian to Walrasian macroeconomics. Moreover, against the background of
the Marshall/Walras divide, the possibility of constructing a real theoretical synthesis between
New Keynesians and New Classicists looks doubtful.262728
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